Sheila Nanderam

He returned to work, but did not function as well. Thus, it would seem that leave to appeal the costs order is not required.

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Approximately a year after the settlement, a new lawyer for the Catanzaros notified Kellogg's that his clients were resiling from the settlement agreement and were going to proceed with the action. Kellogg's moved to enforce the settlement under rule The Catanzaros' argued that court should decline to enforce the settlement on the basis that the infant settlement was not in the best interests of their daughter and that Ms.

Catanzaro was depressed at the time she entered into the settlement and that it was done in haste. The motion judge ordered the settlement to be enforced against the parents on the basis that they had not met their onus of establishing that the settlement ought to be set aside. The motion judge dismissed the motion to enforce the settlement in relation to the infant, finding that it was not supported by the material required under rule 7.

Did the motion judge err in failing to consider the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the settlement?

The discretion to refuse to enforce a settlement should be used rarely. The court in Milios v. Zagas set out the following factors when considering whether to enforce a settlement agreement: The motion judge found these factors were not present in this case and rejected the argument that the offer was accepted in haste.

The court found no error in the finding that the Catanzaros' did not meet their onus of demonstrating that in these circumstances, they should be allowed to resile from the settlement. The MOU was negotiated and signed in Ontario. It set out an arrangement between the parties with respect to the acquisition of Nigerian oil and gas assets. The letter contained defamatory statements against the respondent and was copied to the respondent and others, including the Nigerian Ambassador to Canada.

Some of the claims in the Nigerian action were similar to those in the Ontario action. The respondent moved in The Federal High Court of Nigeria to strike the Nigerian action on grounds that the Nigerian court lacked jurisdiction and was unsuccessful.

The respondent is also appealing that order. On March 2, , the appellants moved to strike or permanently stay the Ontario action on the grounds that Ontario does not have jurisdiction simpliciter or that Ontario is forum non conveniens.

In his reasons, the motion judge concluded that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and identified several presumptive factors that would apply, including that Wale Sola is an Ontario resident and both the MOU and the LA were negotiated and signed in Ontario. He observed that the latter provides that it is governed by Ontario law and contains a choice of forum clause that names Ontario as the jurisdiction where any disputes would be resolved. The court rejected the appellants' submission that the motion judge failed to consider comity in his analysis.

Rather, the court found he considered it implicitly when he outlined and considered all of the relevant factors in coming to his conclusion that Nigeria was not the more convenient forum. The appellants relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that was over-taken by that court's decision in Van Breda v Village Resorts with regard to jurisdiction and forum conveniens issues. The court in Van Breda also mentioned that comity is not a stand-alone factor, but is part and parcel of the forum non conveniens assessment.

The court agreed with the motion judge's conclusion that "balancing all factors, Nigeria is not clearly the appropriate forum for the dispute, and Ontario is not forum non conveniens. The court found this to be proposed "fresh evidence" as the appellants sought to file the reasons for the first time at the hearing of the appeal, despite the reasons being released February 2, and the lower court motion taking place one month later on March 2, The reasons were not before the motion judge and the appellants did not bring a motion to admit fresh evidence.

However, the appellants argued on appeal that the motion judge failed to consider these reasons, despite the reasons not being before him. Theappellants did not meet the Palmer test for the admission of fresh evidence in light of the reasons being available before the motion was heard.

Therefore, the court declined to consider the fresh evidence. The plaintiffs are appealing a jury verdict, which found Can Hoang "Mr. Hoang" solely responsible for the injuries his son a plaintiff suffered when he dropped his son off at an intersection in Toronto. The action against the driver and owner of the car that struck the son was dismissed. The jury awarded Mr.

Counsel appointed by Mr. Hoang's car insurer, The Personal Insurance Company "The Personal" , delivered a notice of cross-appeal asking the court to set aside the finding of liability. At trial, the jury particularized Mr.

Hoang's negligence, and all but one particular did not give rise to coverage under Mr. Hoang's insurance policy as those particulars concerned Mr. Hoang's negligent parental supervision of his son at the time of the accident. The one particular that could give rise to coverage under the policy was Mr. Hoang's "unsuitable choice of unloading area" when he dropped off his son. The plaintiffs and Mr. Hoang in his personal capacity not through his insurer brought a motion to disqualify counsel appointed by The Personal, Mr.

McCarthy, from continuing to represent Mr. Hoang on the appeal and cross-appeal, because of an appearance of a conflict of interest. McCarthy as counsel of record for Mr. Hoang on the appeal and cross-appeal;. Hoang on the appeal and cross-appeal; and.

Applying these principles, the test of reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest is made out in this case as a reasonable bystander might think that counsel appointed by the insurer would focus on overturning the one finding for which the insurer could be liable to indemnify the insured and downplay or focus less on the jury's findings of negligent parental supervision, for which the insurer has no obligation to indemnify.

Hoang, an appellate decision overturning the finding of "unsuitable choice of unloading area", yet leaving in place the findings of negligent parental supervision, would be disastrous, as it would leave him without any prospect of indemnification and his son would be left without any hope of recovery. The Appellant brought a motion to find the Respondent in contempt of an order for failing to preserve certain electronic documents.

The motion judge was not able to find "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the Respondent was in contempt by deleting his personal browsing history from his computer and dismissed the motion.

The Respondent seeks to quash the Appellant's appeal because the order being appealed is interlocutory and therefore falls under the Divisional Court's jurisdiction. The Appellants can seek leave to the Divisional Court. The matter should be appealed to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. While an order finding contempt is final, an order dismissing a motion for contempt is interlocutory Simmonds v. Simmonds, ONCA The appellant appealed the preservation order of the motion judge, ordering that the appellant deliver up the possession of luxury vehicles to the respondent trustee in bankruptcy or, if he no longer had possession of the vehicles, deliver up particulars concerning their sale.

The motion judge also ordered that the appellant's bank accounts be frozen. The trust agreement provided that the assets of Ontario Inc. However, he directed that a copy of his endorsement be sent to the respondent, who brought a motion before the motion judge for preservation of the vehicles and ancillary relief. The motion judge's finding that the appellant had a beneficial interest in some of the vehicles at the time of his bankruptcy was unassailable.

The appellant's interest in the vehicles was affirmed by the trust agreement. It did not arise as a result of Gray J. There were no errors in principle.

The motion judge provided that the appellant could return to court to rescind or vary the order once he provided the respondent with the requested information. The motion judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion. The appellants purchased a car from Downsview Chrysler. Downsview Chrysler obtained the car from the respondent dealer Oxford Dodge, which is managed by the respondent James Bennett "Mr.

The claims were settled with all of the defendants except for Oxford Dodge and Mr. Oxford Dodge and Mr. Bennett brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to have the claims against them dismissed, which the motion judge granted.

The appellants appealed from the order granting summary judgment and dismissing their action. No, the motion judge did not err in granting summary judgment. Nothing on the record gave rise to a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasons and her conclusion. The motion judge found there was no factual foundation for a finding of liability against either Oxford Dodge or Mr.

Bennett on any of the causes of action pleaded. Oxford Dodge had no contractual relationship with the appellants and the appellants led no evidence that would support a finding of negligence or bad faith against it. The appellants admitted that they had never met Mr. Bennett or communicated with him prior to commencing their action and that he did not make any representations to them concerning their purchase of the car.

Moreover, any damages the appellants may have sustained were amply compensated by settlements with the other defendants. Later in his employment, Reddy had a stroke and went on short-term disability. He returned to work, but did not function as well. Reddy had another stroke after he was terminated and was unable to speak or move the left side of his body as a result.

But, because he was no longer employed, Co-Operators Life Insurance "Co-Operators" denied his claim for long-term disability. Reddy sued Freightliner and Co-Operators. In Reddy's reply to Freightliner's defence, he claimed that he was wrongfully terminated.

Freightliner moved for summary judgment. The motion judge dismissed the motion, but acknowledged the statement of claim did not specifically plead that Reddy was wrongfully dismissed. However, the failure to plead those specific words was not fatal to the claim. The motion judge's result and reasons were both correct. It was not fatal that Reddy did not specifically plead wrongful dismissal because the notice of claim alleged the facts that the defendant breached the employment contract.

The only reason Reddy's benefits were denied is because the plaintiff was terminated from his employment. At the core of Reddy's claim is a set of facts establishing an employment relationship and contract, that the employment contract was breached as a result of termination without notice, and that damages flowed from the breach, including loss of LTD benefits. The appellant, Economical Insurance Group "Economical" issued a third party claim involving insurance coverage in a motor vehicle accident against the respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company "State Farm".

State Farm was granted summary judgment dismissing Economical's third party claim. Economical served a notice of appeal and certificate respecting evidence within the day period required by r.

To perfect its appeal, r. Economical required the co-operation of State Farm to sign and enter the order. Economical sent a draft order within the perfection period to State Farm's counsel for approval and requested State Farm's consent to a day extension to perfect the appeal.

State Farm's counsel refused to provide their consent for an extension or approve of the draft order. State Farm finally approved the draft order and agreed to an extension but did not offer to pay costs. At the hearing of the motion, State Farm's counsel advised that they had submitted the approved order for signing and entry the week before but the Registrar refused to process the order on an expedited basis. Economical's request for costs is reasonable.

State Farm failed to perform its obligation to settle an order subject to appeal in a timely manner. Our sympathy goes out to Molly and Sonnyboy as well. Sheila Nanderam of Barrie 20 years and formerly of Meaford, Ontario. Beloved wife of Frank. Devoted mother of David, Davis and Denvy.

Also survived by sister Molly and brother Sonnyboy. Service was held in the chapel on Monday, October 20th, at As an expression of sympathy memorial donations may be made to the Canadian Pulmonary Fibrosis Foundation.

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